that Buddhism is best understood as a philosophy of practice-or a.

Festschrift volume in honour of Mohd. Sabir Hussain, b. 1935.

The arrival in 1909 of the library of manuscripts now known as the Chandra Shum Shere collection increased by well over six thousand the already substantial holdings of the Bodleian and Indian Institute libraries, and made Oxford the repository of the largest known collection of Sanskrit manuscripts outside the Indian subcontinent. It is a huge and uniquely valuable collection of paper and palm leaf manuscripts, purchased for Oxford University by Sir Chandra Shum Shere, the then Prime Minister of (...) Nepal. The General Editor of the catalogue of the collection is Dr Jonathan Katz, Consultant to the Oriental Department of the Bodleian Library, formerly Librarian of the Indian Institute, and present Master of the Queen's Scholars at Westminster School. (shrink)

Bhattacharya, K.C. Swaraj in ideas.--Seal, B. The neo-romantic movement in literature.--Tagore, R. The religion of an artist.--Sri Aurobindo. The ideal spirit of poetry.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 95 direction, it opens a field of pure philosophy, unencumbered by surds such as finite man. Only if the Phenomenology is taken as a monographic work on man can there be difficulty. Let us hasten to add that, on the very premises of his book, Loewenberg's criticism of Hegel is tentative rather than apodictic; its harshness is relieved through the dialogue form. And perhaps, the interlocutors will, (...) as one of them suggests, "resume (their) conversations with fresh minds at a later date" (p. 371). They might find that they have to go beyond the limits of exoteric discussion. Or, conversely, they might find that exoteric treatment can yield no more than an anthropological reading and is, in fact, bound up with it. If Loewenberg 's extant commentary did no more than demonstrate this negative point, however implicitly,it would be of great merit. But there is of course much more: there is the substance of Loewenberg's commentary, largely unaffected by the above counter-representations. Theoretical problems aside, the supreme value of the book lies in its clarity and perceptiveness, in the "sense" it makes of the Phenomenology. Of a kind all its own, it will henceforth serve as the preferred entrance to Hegel. KLAUS HARTMANN Bonn, W. Germany Arthur Hfibscher, editor. XXXVIlI. Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch ]~r das Jahr 1957. (Frankfurt/ Main: Waldemar Kramer, 1967.Pp. v + 244.) Schopenhauer: Philosophe de l'Absurde. By Clement Brosset. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967.Pp. ix [i] -b 107.Paper, F. 7.--) Manches in dem Jahrbuch ist rein anekdotisch; manches bio- oder bibliographisch. Einiges h~ngt nur sehr lose mit Schopenhauer zusammen; so der liingste Beitrag (K. Engisch, "Todesstrafe--ja oder nein?,") mit nfitzlicher historischer und systematiseher Ubersieht, die zum Ergebnis kommt, dass die Argumente gegen die Todesstrafe iiberwiegen. Von gesetzgeberischen Interessen getragen ist such G. Zoebe, "Sind die Tiere rechtlos?" Der zweitliingste Beitrag (H. Voigt, 'r0ber Schopenhauers Erkenntnistheorie,') enth~ilt eine Art von Variationen sum Thema des Zusammenhanges zwischen Charakter und Schicksah Man freut sich, dass ein Inder (Kanti Chandra Pandey) sich fiber Schopenhauers Kenntnis des Hinduismus und Buddismus eehr anerkennendausspricht. Das Bild der Sehopenhauerschen Philosophie, wie es uns im Jahrbuch begeguet ist das uns vertraute: Pessimismus, ErlSsung durch Kunst, Mitleid, Verneinung des Willens. Aber nach Brosset erfassen diese Kategorien nur die sekund~ren Charaktere der Schopenhauerschen Philosophie. In ihrem wirklich wertvollen Kern sei diese Philosophie erstens Vorl~uferin der yon Brosset so genannten genealogischen Philosophie eines Marx, Nietzsche und Freud; allerdings letzten Endes ein Versager, da sie auf das eigentliche Anliegen der genealogischen Philosophie, n~mlich die Ableitung konkreter und spezifischer Ideen (bei Schopenhauer: der Intelligenz) aus der Umformung unbewusster Tatbestiinde (bei Schopenhauer: des Willens), nicht eingehe, sondern sich mit der Feststellung begniigt, dass die Wurzel der (bewussten) InteUigenz der (unbewusste) Wille ist. Zweitens sei Schopenhauer der erste, der seine Philosophie auf der Urerfahrung der Grundlosigkeit (Brosset zieht den Ausdruck Absurdit~t vor), daher Unausdenkbarkeit oder Unergrfindlichkeit des Seins im ganzen, aufbaut. Auf diese Erfahrung (die Frage, 'Warum nicht Nichts?' ist unbeantwortbar) reagiere der Menseh mit Angst. Die Notwendigkeit und die Zweckm~issigkeit, die die Welt im ganzen charskterisieren, seien selbst kontingent und zwecklos. Manchmal scheint mir Brosset die Originalitiit seiner Interpretationen zu iiberseh~tzen; insbesondere seine Erkl~rung der Blindheit des Willens (S. 26f.) rennt wohl offene Tfiren ein. PHILIP MERLAN ~cripps College, Claremont, California... (shrink)

This sixth volume of Collected Papers includes 74 papers comprising 974 pages on (theoretic and applied) neutrosophics, written between 2015-2021 by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 121 co-authors from 19 countries: Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Abdel Nasser H. Zaied, Abduallah Gamal, Amir Abdullah, Firoz Ahmad, Nadeem Ahmad, Ahmad Yusuf Adhami, Ahmed Aboelfetouh, Ahmed Mostafa Khalil, Shariful Alam, W. Alharbi, Ali Hassan, Mumtaz Ali, Amira S. Ashour, Asmaa Atef, Assia Bakali, Ayoub Bahnasse, A. A. Azzam, Willem K.M. Brauers, Bui (...) Cong Cuong, Fausto Cavallaro, Ahmet Çevik, Robby I. Chandra, Kalaivani Chandran, Victor Chang, Chang Su Kim, Jyotir Moy Chatterjee, Victor Christianto, Chunxin Bo, Mihaela Colhon, Shyamal Dalapati, Arindam Dey, Dunqian Cao, Fahad Alsharari, Faruk Karaaslan, Aleksandra Fedajev, Daniela Gîfu, Hina Gulzar, Haitham A. El-Ghareeb, Masooma Raza Hashmi, Hewayda El-Ghawalby, Hoang Viet Long, Le Hoang Son, F. Nirmala Irudayam, Branislav Ivanov, S. Jafari, Jeong Gon Lee, Milena Jevtić, Sudan Jha, Junhui Kim, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Darjan Karabašević, Songül Karabatak, Abdullah Kargın, M. Karthika, Ieva Meidute-Kavaliauskiene, Madad Khan, Majid Khan, Manju Khari, Kifayat Ullah, K. Kishore, Kul Hur, Santanu Kumar Patro, Prem Kumar Singh, Raghvendra Kumar, Tapan Kumar Roy, Malayalan Lathamaheswari, Luu Quoc Dat, T. Madhumathi, Tahir Mahmood, Mladjan Maksimovic, Gunasekaran Manogaran, Nivetha Martin, M. Kasi Mayan, Mai Mohamed, Mohamed Talea, Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Gulistan, Raja Muhammad Hashim, Muhammad Riaz, Muhammad Saeed, Rana Muhammad Zulqarnain, Nada A. Nabeeh, Deivanayagampillai Nagarajan, Xenia Negrea, Nguyen Xuan Thao, Jagan M. Obbineni, Angelo de Oliveira, M. Parimala, Gabrijela Popovic, Ishaani Priyadarshini, Yaser Saber, Mehmet Șahin, Said Broumi, A. A. Salama, M. Saleh, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Dönüș Șengür, Shio Gai Quek, Songtao Shao, Dragiša Stanujkić, Surapati Pramanik, Swathi Sundari Sundaramoorthy, Mirela Teodorescu, Selçuk Topal, Muhammed Turhan, Alptekin Ulutaș, Luige Vlădăreanu, Victor Vlădăreanu, Ştefan Vlăduţescu, Dan Valeriu Voinea, Volkan Duran, Navneet Yadav, Yanhui Guo, Naveed Yaqoob, Yongquan Zhou, Young Bae Jun, Xiaohong Zhang, Xiao Long Xin, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas. (shrink)

This ninth volume of Collected Papers includes 87 papers comprising 982 pages on Neutrosophic Theory and its applications in Algebra, written between 2014-2022 by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 81 co-authors (alphabetically ordered) from 19 countries: E.O. Adeleke, A.A.A. Agboola, Ahmed B. Al-Nafee, Ahmed Mostafa Khalil, Akbar Rezaei, S.A. Akinleye, Ali Hassan, Mumtaz Ali, Rajab Ali Borzooei , Assia Bakali, Cenap Özel, Victor Christianto, Chunxin Bo, Rakhal Das, Bijan Davvaz, R. Dhavaseelan, B. Elavarasan, Fahad Alsharari, T. (...) Gharibah, Hina Gulzar, Hashem Bordbar, Le Hoang Son, Emmanuel Ilojide, Tèmítópé Gbóláhàn Jaíyéolá, M. Karthika, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Huma Khan, Madad Khan, Mohsin Khan, Hee Sik Kim, Seon Jeong Kim, Valeri Kromov, R. M. Latif, Madeleine Al-Tahan, Mehmat Ali Ozturk, Minghao Hu, S. Mirvakili, Mohammad Abobala, Mohammad Hamidi, Mohammed Abdel-Sattar, Mohammed A. Al Shumrani, Mohamed Talea, Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Aslam, Muhammad Aslam Malik, Muhammad Gulistan, Muhammad Shabir, G. Muhiuddin, Memudu Olaposi Olatinwo, Osman Anis, Choonkil Park, M. Parimala, Ping Li, K. Porselvi, D. Preethi, S. Rajareega, N. Rajesh, Udhayakumar Ramalingam, Riad K. Al-Hamido, Yaser Saber, Arsham Borumand Saeid, Saeid Jafari, Said Broumi, A.A. Salama, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Songtao Shao, Seok-Zun Song, Tahsin Oner, M. Mohseni Takallo, Binod Chandra Tripathy, Tugce Katican, J. Vimala, Xiaohong Zhang, Xiaoyan Mao, Xiaoying Wu, Xingliang Liang, Xin Zhou, Yingcang Ma, Young Bae Jun, Juanjuan Zhang. (shrink)

В монографии представлены взгляды авторов на возникновение и развитие либеральной и консервативной идеологий в политической истории российского государства.

I examine whether or not it is apt to attribute knowledge to groups of scientists. I argue that though research teams can be aptly described as having knowledge, communities of scientists identified with research fields, and the scientific community as a whole are not capable of knowing. Scientists involved in research teams are dependent on each other, and are organized in a manner to advance a goal. Such teams also adopt views that may not be identical to the views of (...) the individual members of the group. (shrink)

My aim is to evaluate a new realist strategy for addressing the pessimistic induction, Ludwig Fahrbach’s (Synthese 180:139–155, 2011) appeal to the exponential growth of science. Fahrbach aims to show that, given the exponential growth of science, the history of science supports realism. I argue that Fahrbach is mistaken. I aim to show that earlier generations of scientists could construct a similar argument, but one that aims to show that the theories that they accepted are likely true. The problem with (...) this is that from our perspective on the history of science we know their argument is flawed. Consequently, we should not be impressed or persuaded by Fahrbach’s argument. Fahrbach has failed to identify a difference that matters between today’s theories and past theories. But realists need to find such a difference if they are to undermine the pessimistic induction. (shrink)

Noise in behavior is often viewed as a nuisance: while the mind aims to take the best possible action, it is let down by unreliability in the sensory and response systems. How researchers study cognition reflects this viewpoint – averaging over trials and participants to discover the deterministic relationships between experimental manipulations and their behavioral consequences, with noise represented as additive, often Gaussian, and independent. Yet a careful look at behavioral noise reveals rich structure that defies easy explanation. First, both (...) perceptual and preferential judgments show that sensory and response noise may potentially only play minor roles, with most noise arising in the cognitive computations. Second, the functional form of the noise is both non-Gaussian and non-independent, with the distribution of noise being better characterized as heavy-tailed and as having substantial long-range autocorrelations. It is possible that this structure results from brains that are, for some reason, bedeviled by a fundamental design flaw, albeit one with intriguingly distinctive characteristics. Alternatively, noise might not be a bug but a feature: indeed, we suggest that noise is fundamental to how cognition works. Specifically, we propose that the brain approximates probabilistic inference with a local sampling algorithm, one that uses randomness to drive its exploration of alternative hypotheses. Reframing cognition in this way explains the rich structure of noise and leads to a surprising conclusion: that noise is not a symptom of cognitive malfunction but plays a central role in underpinning human intelligence. (shrink)

The anti-realist argument from underconsideration focuses on the fact that, when scientists evaluate theories, they only ever consider a subset of the theories that can account for the available data. As a result, when scientists judge one theory to be superior to competitor theories, they are not warranted in drawing the conclusion that the superior theory is likely true with respect to what it says about unobservable entities and processes. I defend the argument from underconsideration from the objections of Peter (...) Lipton. I argue that the inconsistency that Lipton claims to find in the argument vanishes once we understand what the anti-realist means when she claims that scientists are reliable. I also argue that collapsing the distinction between relative and absolute evaluations, as Lipton recommends, has its costs. Finally, I briefly examine Richard Boyd's influential defence of realism. (shrink)

Zaman, düşünce tarihinde üzerinde çokça tartışılmış ve muhtelif tanımlamaları yapılmış bir kavramdır. Bu makale de zamanın tanımlamasından ziyade onun üzerinde özellikle an kavramı merkezli bir düşünce etkinliği ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bilhassa zaman ve an kavramları arasındaki farka değinilmiştir. Zamanın hareketin olduğu yerde var olduğunu, anın ise hem hareketin hem de durağanlığın olduğu her yerde karşımıza çıktığını belirterek zamanın akışkan hayatı ölçülebilir kılma çabasında var oluşuyla, anın ise bu akışkanlığın her safhasında var olduğuna temas edilmiştir. Aynı zamanda anın varoluş ile mütemadiyen (...) yan yana olduğu, algılanışının ise bireylerin tecrübeleriyle zuhur ettiği görüşü ortaya konulmuştur. An’ın insan tecrübesiyle anlam kazanması ve insanın anı nasıl değerlendirmesi gerektiği hususunda konu, kanaatimizce Asr Suresi ve Hz. Peygamberin (s.a.v) buyruğu ile temellendirilmiştir. Bahsi geçen konu, çeşitli filozofların görüşleri ile de desteklenmiştir. Daha sonra makalemizde modern düşüncenin insanı anı kaliteli yaşamaktan ziyade daha iyi gelecek vaadiyle kaygı ve huzursuzluğa sevk ettiğini ifade ettik. Makalemizin sonunda ise İslam’ın bu modern düşüncenin aksine insana akışkanlık içerisinde yaşarken anın kendisine sunduğu akışkanlığın her bir aşamasını en güzel şekilde değerlendirmesini emrettiği ve onu değerli bir maden gibi tavında işlemesi gerektiği mesajıyla sonuçlandırdık. (shrink)

The covariant Klein-Gordon equation requires twice the boundary conditions of the Schrödinger equation and does not have an accepted single-particle interpretation. Instead of interpreting its solution as a probability wave determined by an initial boundary condition, this paper considers the possibility that the solutions are determined by both an initial and a final boundary condition. By constructing an invariant joint probability distribution from the size of the solution space, it is shown that the usual measurement probabilities can nearly be recovered (...) in the non-relativistic limit, provided that neither boundary constrains the energy to a precision near ℏ/t 0 (where t 0 is the time duration between the boundary conditions). Otherwise, deviations from standard quantum mechanics are predicted. (shrink)

Realists and anti-realists disagree about whether contemporary scientists are epistemically privileged. Because the issue of epistemic privilege figures in arguments in support of and against theoretical knowledge in science, it is worth examining whether or not there is any basis for assuming such privilege. I show that arguments that try to explain the success of science by appeal to some sort of epistemic privilege have, so far, failed. They have failed to give us reason to believe (i) that scientists are (...) prone to develop theories that are true, (ii) that our current theories are not apt to be replaced in the future, and (iii) that science is nearing its completion. (shrink)

A time-symmetric formulation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics is developed by applying two consecutive boundary conditions onto solutions of a time- symmetrized wave equation. From known probabilities in ordinary quantum mechanics, a time-symmetric parameter P0 is then derived that properly weights the likelihood of any complete sequence of measurement outcomes on a quantum system. The results appear to match standard quantum mechanics, but do so without requiring a time-asymmetric collapse of the wavefunction upon measurement, thereby realigning quantum mechanics with an important (...) fundamental symmetry. (shrink)